Economic Liberty: An Exploration of the Link Between the Constitution of the United States, Materialsim and Basis Freedom by Murphy, Betty Southard
Marquette Law Review
Volume 70
Issue 3 Spring 1987 Article 7
Economic Liberty: An Exploration of the Link
Between the Constitution of the United States,
Materialsim and Basis Freedom
Betty Southard Murphy
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Betty Southard Murphy, Economic Liberty: An Exploration of the Link Between the Constitution of the United States, Materialsim and Basis
Freedom, 70 Marq. L. Rev. 443 (1987).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol70/iss3/7
ECONOMIC LIBERTY: AN
EXPLORATION OF THE LINK
BETWEEN THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES,
MATERIALISM AND BASIC FREEDOM
BET=Y SOUTHARD MURPHY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Bicentennial of the Constitution gives us a wonderful
opportunity to examine our roots and to see whether the
greatest experiment in all the world - an experiment
designed to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
our Posterity"1 - is alive and well as we enter the twenty-first
century. The Framers of the Constitution shared a burning
desire to establish a republic such as the world had never seen
- a republic that would guarantee basic freedoms for all
citizens.
Of all the Framers, James Madison and Alexander Hamil-
ton did the most to secure the ratification of the Constitution.
In order to garner support for the Constitution, Hamilton and
Madison, assisted by John Jay, wrote eighty-five political es-
says which were published from October 27, 1787, to August
16, 1788, in New York City newspapers. This collection of
essays, known as The Federalist Papers, is recognized today as
one of the most important political works ever written. The
Federalist Papers also provide valuable insight into the ideas
and philosophies which motivated the Framers of the
Constitution.
The Framers sought to create a strong, energetic union -
one which would guarantee religious and political freedom.
* Mrs. Murphy, former Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board and for-
mer Administrator of the Wage and Hours Division of the U.S. Department of Labor, is
a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of the national law firm of Baker & Hostetler.
She is also a member of the Commission on the Bicentennial of the Constitution of the
United States, and is Chairman of the International Advisory Committee. Mrs. Mur-
phy acknowledges the assistance of Peter D. Rich, an associate with Baker & Hostetler,
in preparing this article.
1. U.S. CONST. preamble.
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They, however, recognized that moral and religious motives
alone were insufficient to attain their objectives. As a result of
the extremely unfavorable treatment afforded certain property
holders under the Articles of Confederation, the Framers were
sensitive to economic liberties and valued the ownership of
property as a foremost personal right. Moreover, the Framers
were acutely aware of society's propensity to separate into
competing factions, a propensity which, if not properly regu-
lated, could destroy society.
Consequently, with these concerns in mind, Madison and
Hamilton were determined to create a commercial republic -
a new form of government that would secure the safety and
happiness of a strong, unified populace. The purpose of this
article is to demonstrate that the protection of individual eco-
nomic rights and the encouragement of materialism as the
lynchpin of basic freedom were the primary motivating forces
behind the Framers' efforts in drafting the Constitution of the
United States and structuring the new republic.
II. THE FRAMERS' INTENT
A. Prevention of Factionalism
The authors of The Federalist Papers recognized that fac-
tional competition posed the greatest threat to the stability,
power and basic viability of their envisioned republic. They
believed that a government had to protect and distract the
people from such selfish domestic partisanship in order to cre-
ate a strong, central union.2
As Madison noted in The Federalist No. 10, one of the
strongest arguments in support of the proposed Constitution
was that it established a government capable of controlling the
violence and damage caused by factions.3 Madison defined a
faction as "a number of citizens.., who are united and actu-
ated by some common impulse of passion or of interest, ad-
verse to the rights of other citizens." 4 He warned that people
have a strong natural tendency to divide into political factions
2. Diamond, Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers' In-
tent, 53 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 52, 62 (1959).
3. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 62-65 (J. Madison) (. Cooke ed. 1961) [hereinafter
THE FEDERALIST No. 10].
4. Id. at 57.
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and even to fabricate reasons to conflict with one another:
"So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual
animosities that, where no substantial occasion presents itself,
the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been suffi-
cient to kindle their unfriendly passions, and excite their most
violent conflicts."5
Hamilton and Madison also foresaw that a majority fac-
tion could amass the power to force its "frivolous and fanciful
distinctions" upon the other members of society. In order to
prevent the majority from usurping power, Hamilton and
Madison believed that the republic had to be structured either
to avoid the existence of a single, unifying passion or to bar
the implementation of the scheme of the majority.6 That
Madison was a proponent of the first of these two alternatives
is evidenced by his conviction that the struggle of classes
should be replaced by a struggle of interests, because "[c]lass
struggle is domestic convulsion; [whereas] the struggle of in-
terests is a safe, even energizing, struggle which is compatible
with, or even promotes, the safety and stability of society."7
Madison further explained that, while the formation of a
majority political faction in a small democratic society is una-
voidable - where the many are divided into only a few trades
- such an occurrence can be prevented in a large commercial
society:
[When] you take in a greater variety of parties and interests,
you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will
have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens;
or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult
for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act
in unison with each other.8
Accordingly, Madison's theory holds that in a large com-
mercial republic the majority will not unite as one to make
extreme demands upon the few, an event which could destroy
society. Rather, the majority will fragment into smaller
groups seek immediate advantages for their own narrow and
particular interests. 9
5. Id. at 59.
6. Diamond, supra note 2, at 65.
7. Id. at 66.
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 3, at 64.
9. Diamond, supra note 2, at 66.
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In other words, fighting for individual interests is a posi-
tive economic force which ultimately acts to unite and pre-
serve, rather than fragment, the republic. As Adam Smith
wrote - and as Hamilton and Madison believed - by struc-
turing a government so that its citizens could pursue their own
self-interests in freedom and security, a framework would be
provided by which people would be "led by an invisible hand
to promote an end"' 0 beneficial to all of society.
John Locke, whose views were known to virtually every
American involved in the forming of the new republic, had
taught that ownership of property was a natural right."
Madison, a follower of Locke, perceived that the unequal divi-
sion of property constituted the most common source of fac-
tions. This division and others like it cause the formation of
distinct interest groups in a given society. Consequently,
"[tihe first object of government," Madison declared, is the
protection of "the diversity in the faculties of men, from
which the rights of property originate."'' 2
Thus, in recognizing that the solution to the problem of
factionalism lay in forestalling the dominance of a single inter-
est or class, the Framers were able to conceive of a form of
government which, through free enterprise and economic lib-
erty, would guarantee the protection of individual rights.
Factionalism could be avoided by directing the people's en-
ergy into commerce.
B. Protection of Property and Other Fundamental Rights
It is clear that the Framers did not intend to redistribute
property in order to remove a primary source of factions;
rather, they sought to create a government which could pre-
vent the unhealthy combination of such interests. The Fram-
ers believed that the structure for achieving these goals would
be created by the Constitution. 3
10. A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 423 (1776).
11. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 288-89 (1688).
12. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution, in ESSAYS ON THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 8 (L. Levy ed. 1969) [hereinafter Beard Essay].
13. Id. at 10-11.
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An examination of the economic situation which existed
under the Articles of Confederation sheds further light on
why the protection of economic and property interests was of
critical importance to the Framers. The central government
had no power to regulate commerce or to tax directly. Conse-
quently, the federal government was unable to guarantee that
it could secure money to pay the holders of its securities. As a
result, those private citizens who had invested in public secur-
ities did not receive the interest and principal amount to
which they were entitled. Furthermore, state legislatures op-
erated without significant judicial control or restrictions and
continually attacked private property rights, particularly
those from out of state. The failure of the federal and state
governments to protect basic property and other economic
rights caused many delegates to attend the Constitutional
Convention with a goal of securing strong legal rights in those
domains through a strengthened national government. 14
The Framers believed that property rights were intimately
related to other fundamental rights. The vast majority of del-
egates to the Constitutional Convention agreed that the pres-
ervation of individual property rights was a primary function
of government and that property rights were instrumental in
providing freedom, autonomy, and independence for the aver-
age citizen. For example, in a speech at the Constitutional
Convention, Governor Morris, a prominent and influential
delegate from Pennsylvania stated, "[l]ife and liberty were
generally said to be of more value than property. An accurate
view of the matter would nevertheless prove that property was
the main object of Society." 15
The Framers also recognized that a government which is
freely able to confiscate privately-owned property possesses
enormous power. Such power would certainly dissuade peo-
ple from criticizing the government out of fear of retribution.
On the other hand, a government which is not able to confis-
cate property arbitrarily would not possess such an inhibiting
and overwhelming power.
14. C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 52-53 (1925) [hereinafter BEARD].
15. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 533 (M. Farrand
ed. 1937).
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Thus, it is clear that the Framers recognized the owner-
ship of property as a foremost personal right which they ac-
tively sought to protect. 16 They also realized that security of
property ownership meant that people could work hard and,
except for taxes, retain the fruits of their labor for themselves,
their families, and their descendants, regardless of their polit-
ical beliefs. Neither the government, nor anyone else, could
take their property without paying for it. Secure in their own-
ership of property, the people would not have to bow down to
political authority. Instead, they could speak their minds and
vote their choices without having their property confiscated.
Citizens of the republic, now united, would support and fight
to defend a government that allowed them to acquire property
and that could not take their property without due process of
law. Thus, economic liberty was intended to be the founda-
tion for personal liberty.
III. THE FRAMERS' INTENTIONS AS EMBODIED
IN THE CONSTITUTION
A. The Basic Structure of the New Republic
Madison formulated a fundamental political theory in
which he recognized three central elements: (1) no mere
"parchment" separation of the departments of government
would be effective; (2) the structure of the government must
provide a system of checks and balances; and (3) the structure
of the government must protect against the rising of majority
factions.17 This theory was the basis for the original Ameri-
can conception of the balance of powers.
In discussing the structure of his envisioned government,
Madison wrote that the only answer lies in "so contriving the
interior structure of the government, as that its several con-
stituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of
keeping each other in their proper places."' 18 This is the foun-
16. Siegan, The Constitution and the Protection of Capitalism, in How CAPITALIS-
TIC IS THE CONSTITUTION 108 (R. GoIdwin & W. Schambra ed. 1982) [hereinafter
Siegan].
17. BEARD, supra note 14, at 159-60.
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 347-48 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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dation of what has come to be known as the separation of
powers doctrine.19
An examination of the government structure created at the
Constitutional Convention of 1787 reveals the enormous skill
and ingenuity which the Framers utilized in designing the
means by which to check the abuse of majority power. As
Charles Beard describes:
Their leading idea was to break up the attacking forces at the
starting point: the source of political authority for the sev-
eral branches of the government. This disintegration of posi-
tive action at the source was further facilitated by the
differentiation in the terms given to the respective depart-
ments of the government. And the crowning counterweight
to "an interested and overbearing majority," as Madison
phrased it, was secured in the peculiar position assigned to
the judiciary, and the use of the sanctity and mystery of the
law as a foil to democratic attacks. 20
Hamilton expounded on this concept in The Federalist No. 60
when he said, "[t]he dissimilarity in the ingredients, which
will compose the national government; and still more in the
manner in which they will be brought into action in its various
branches must form a powerful obstacle to a concert of views
... ."21 Hamilton further explained that the people of the
republic were of sufficient diversity in the "state of property,
in their genius, manners, and habits" as to elicit a significant
"diversity of disposition in their representatives towards the
different ranks and conditions of society."'22
Although Hamilton suspected that the relationship the
representatives would share by virtue of their working to-
gether under the same government would "promote a gradual
assimilation of temper and sentiment," he strongly believed
that their innate differences would "permanently nourish dif-
ferent propensities and inclinations. "23
19. As previously discussed herein and as Madison espoused in his political theory,
the prevention of majority tyranny was a central factor in designing the structure of the
government. Madison believed that the best method for preventing the rise of a domi-
nant majority faction was to extend the territory and thus to draw in a greater variety of
interests. Id.
20. BEARD, supra note 14, at 161.
21. THE FEDERALIST No. 60, at 404 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
22. Id. at 404-05.
23. Id. at 405.
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Thus, it can be seen today that the Framers succeeded in
designing the government in such a way that power was frag-
mented among the various branches, and the citizens of the
republic could remain free of majority tyranny. The Framers
believed that separation of powers and representative govern-
ment, especially the former, were crucial elements in the
structure of the new republic. As Madison wrote, the separa-
tion of powers principle is an "essential precaution in favor of
liberty."24
B. Restrictions on Economic Powers of the States: A
Framework for the Protection of Individual
Economic Liberty
1. The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Contracts Clause
In addition to establishing the basic structure of the federal
government, the Framers set out to define the limitations of
state and federal powers. A significant concern of the Fram-
ers was to limit state authority in commercial matters. In a
letter to Thomas Jefferson, dated October, 1787, Madison
elaborated on the principle of federal control over state
legislation:
The mutability of the laws of the States... is found to be [a]
serious evil. The injustice of them has been so frequent and
so flagrant as to alarm the most steadfast friends of Republi-
canism. I am persuaded that I do not err in saying that the
evils issuing from these sources contributed more to that un-
easiness which produced the Convention, and prepared the
public mind for a general reform, than those which accrued
to our national character and interest from the inadequacy
of the Confederation to its immediate objects. A reform,
therefore, which does not make provision for private rights
must be materially defective.25
In order to place specific limitations upon the economic
powers of the states, the Framers drafted the ex post facto
clause and the contracts clause.26 Some commentators believe
that at the time of the Constitution's ratification the ex post
24. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 323 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
25. Beard Essay, supra note 12, at 20-21.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... pass any... ex post facto
Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts...."). Article 1, § 9, cI. 3 contains
a similar ex post facto clause which is applicable to the federal government. U.S.
[Vol. 70:443
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facto clause was intended to apply to both civil and criminal
retroactive laws.27 In 1798, however, the Supreme Court, in
Calder v. Bull,28 limited the application of this clause to crimi-
nal laws. Although the Calder holding is still recognized to-
day, it has continued to be the subject of controversy. 29 Those
commentators who contend that the Framers intended the ex
post facto clause to apply to both civil and criminal matters
point out that under their interpretation, the government
would be prevented from passing any ex post facto law which
deprived individuals of property or other economic benefits
which they had previously obtained.30
The contracts clause is also important in that it protects
not only the obligation of contracts, but also personal security
and private rights. Hamilton believed that the contracts
clause was one of the most commendable features of the Con-
stitution. In a letter to George Washington, dated May 29,
1790, Hamilton wrote:
This [the contracts clause], to the more enlightened part of
the community, was not one of the least recommendations of
that Constitution. The too frequent intermeddlings of the
state legislatures in relation to private contracts were exten-
sively felt and seriously lamented; and a Constitution which
promised a preventative was... eagerly embraced.31
However, in Ogden v. Saunders,32 an early Supreme Court
case involving the contracts clause, the Court addressed the
issue of whether a New York bankruptcy law, which was en-
acted prior to the execution of a promissory note, could affect
the obligation of the parties to that note. In a four-to-three
decision, the Court upheld the power of the states to pass
bankruptcy laws.33
CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl.3. An ex post facto law is one which makes criminal a prior action
that was legal when committed.
27. Siegan, supra note 16, at 111.
28. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
29. Siegan, supra note 16, at 111.
30. As one such commentator points out: "[T]he evidence is persuasive that the
framers considered the ex post facto provisions as guarantees against [the confiscation of
property]. Despite this probable understanding, the Supreme Court in 1798 construed
these provisions as applying only to criminal matters, and removed the protection of
ownership from their reach." Siegan, supra note 16, at 30.
31. Beard Essay, supra note 12, at 22.
32. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
33. Siegan, supra note 16, at 112-13.
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The Ogden holding severely limited the effectiveness of the
contracts clause in protecting individual economic liberty. It
is worth noting that in Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall - in the
only dissent he wrote in a constitutional matter during his
thirty-four years as Chief Justice - expressed his belief that
the contracts clause was intended to protect an individual's
ability to enter into and make contracts free from state inter-
ference, and that any laws which altered the provisions of a
contract, whether passed before or after the execution of a
contract, impaired the contractual obligations and rights of
the parties.34 Clearly, the regulatory power of the states with
regard to individual economic liberty would have been se-
verely limited if Marshall's interpretation of the contracts
clause had prevailed.
Like Marshall, the Framers intended to grant broad power
to the federal government and expressly limited the power of
the states in order to ensure that the citizens of the new repub-
lic would be guaranteed an equal, unbiased stake in a national
economy.
2. The Commerce Clause
The Framers believed that lodging strong economic regu-
latory power in the federal government would also be an effec-
tive means of preserving individual liberty. Through the
commerce clause, the Framers authorized Congress to "regu-
late Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States. '35 This power gave Congress the ability to promote
the economic interests of citizens on a national scale. Rather
than limiting the scope of federal power by expressly enumer-
ating specific economic powers, the Framers opted to grant
Congress broad power in the area of commerce and to allow
such power to evolve gradually through social and economic
change.36
The commerce clause has played a significant role in deter-
mining the scope of federalism and the permissible uses of fed-
eral power. In interpreting the commerce clause, the courts
34. Id. at 337.
35. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
36. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 138-39 (2d ed.
1983) [hereinafter NOWAK].
[Vol. 70:443
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have continually striven to define the limitations of state and
federal power.37 An analysis of the Constitution and the de-
bates surrounding commercial issues at the Constitutional
Convention suggests that the Framers envisioned an activist
national government in the areas of economic promotion and
development.38 However, in the area of interstate commerce,
the federal laws, policies and court decisions that emerged af-
ter the signing of the Constitution varied greatly from the
Framers' vision.39 Although the Supreme Court originally in-
terpreted the commerce power so as to grant plenary power to
Congress with regard to interstate commerce,40 the Court re-
treated from this position for many years. During this period
of retrenchment, the Supreme Court often invalidated federal
legislation and upheld state legislation in the area of interstate
commerce.
Nevertheless, an examination of the circumstances preced-
ing and surrounding the Constitutional Convention of 1787
sheds further light on the Framers' intent to give Congress
plenary power over interstate commerce. Under the Articles
of Confederation, the Continental Congress - despite having
some power over national affairs - had virtually no power
over interstate commerce. The individual states were under-
standably reluctant to relinquish any control over their own
state economies. This lack of centralized authority over inter-
state commerce, coupled with conflicting state interests, led to
economic chaos. Individual states began imposing trade bar-
riers and taxes on goods passing through their borders. Many
states imposed such a burdensome tax on incoming goods that
they effectively foreclosed access to their respective markets.
Thus, in large part out of fear of impending economic warfare
between the states, the Constitutional Convention was called
in an effort to formulate an effective method for dealing with
the problems of interstate commerce.1 It was in response to
37. See, eg., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth. 469 U.S. 528 (1985);
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111 (1942); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
38. See A. HAMILTON, Report on the Subject of Manufacturers of 1791, in 10 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 230 (H. Syrett ed. 1966).
39. See Abel, Commerce Regulation Before Gibbons v. Ogden: Interstate Transpor-
tation Facilities, 25 N.C.L. REV. 121 (1947).
40. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
41. NOWAK, supra note 36, at 144-46.
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these problems and concerns that the Framers added the com-
merce clause.
As Hamilton said in The Federalist No. 12, the Constitu-
tion envisioned the creation of "one great American sys-
tem"-a large commercial republic.42 The Framers of the
Constitution were wise enough to let the role of government in
regulating commercial enterprise evolve with social and eco-
nomic change. It was not by accident that article I, section 8
of the Constitution gave Congress the authority to "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States."43
In 1824, when the question arose as to the scope of the
commerce clause, Chief Justice John Marshall, in Gibbons v.
Ogden,44 defined commerce to include every species of power
of Congress over interstate commerce.4 5 In other words, if a
state law in this area collides with a law validly enacted by
Congress, the state law must yield to the law of Congress.
Only federal regulation of interstate and foreign commerce
could guarantee uniformity. The doctrine stimulated an al-
ready growing national economy.
In Gibbons, Chief Justice Marshall not only defined com-
merce to include every species of commercial intercourse but
he also declared that commerce extended into every state:
"Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more:
it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse be-
tween nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is
regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that inter-
course."4 6 In construing the commerce clause so as to grant
Congress plenary power over interstate commerce, Marshall
reflected the intent of the Framers, which was to lodge broad
powers in the national government.
It is important to note that the Constitution does not ex-
pressly articualte the boundaries of the commerce power, par-
ticularly when Congress has not spoken in the area.47 As
42. See THE FEDERALIST No. 12 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) [hereinafter
THE FEDERALIST No. 12].
43. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
44. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
45. See id. at 7.
46. Id. at 5.
47. NOWAK, supra note 36, at 268.
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Marshall recognized in Gibbons, the states do have the author-
ity to regulate commerce prusuant to the "dormant" com-
merce clause, that is, when Congress has not enacted
conflicting laws.48
It soon became apparent, however, that individual eco-
nomic liberty and the growth of a national economy would be
thwarted if the states could freely and arbitrarily regulate
commerce in the absence of congressional action. Accord-
ingly, the Supreme Court was called upon to define the extent
to which the states can regulate commerce in the face of con-
gressional silence. The Court has rejected the theory of an
exclusive role for Congress in the area of commerce, but has
also declined to validate every state law enacted purusuant to
the dormant commerce clause,49 Rather, the Court has se-
lected to middle ground in which it evaluates the state regula-
tion in terms of whether the state's interest in enforcing its
regulation outweighs the burden of the regulation on inter-
state commerce. 50
Over the years , the Court generally has promoted a na-
tional economy and protected individual economic rights by
striking down overly burdensome state regulations.51 Specifi-
cally, the Court has usually found that the state's interest in
regulating commerce does not outweigh the burden which the
particular state law places on interstate commerce and indi-
vidual liberty.52
However, as previously mentoned, where Congress has
regulated a particular area of commerce, any conflicting state
law is preempted. Accordingly, the Court has also been called
48. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 7.
49. See, e.g., Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 244 (1829)
(upholding state regulation of interstate commerce as a valid exercise of a state's police
power); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 229 (1851) (upholding state
regulation because subject matter of the regulation of a sufficiently local nature as to
require different treatment from state to state).
50. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
51. See, e.g., South Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (striking down state
regulation prohibiting operation of trains having more than 14 passenger cars or 40
freight cars as clearly discriminatory against interstate commerce); Raymond Motor
Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978) (striking down Wisconsin statute barring
double-trailer trucks from its highways as having discriminatory purpose); Kassel v.
Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (striking down Iowa statute bar-
ring 65 foot double-trailer units as discriminatory against out-of-state residents).
52. See id.
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upon to determine whether such federal regulation is a valid
exercise of the commerce power. 3 In Gibbons, Marshall in-
terpreted the commerce clause as granting broad power to
Congress. Soon after the Gibbons decision, however, the
Court retreated from Marshall's position and began to limit
the scope of federal power over interstate commerce. Mar-
shall's theory was explicitly recognized again not until 1942.
The retreat from Marshall's broad definition of the com-
merce clause began with the Supreme Court's formulation of
the concept of "dual federalism," a theory under which the
tenth amendment was regarded as a limitation on the source
of Congressional power. The tenth amendment provides
that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people."' 55 Under the "dual
federalism" theory, the federal government may only regulate
the specific, express activities which are not reserved to the
States, thus limiting excesses of federal power.5 6
The most noted case in the "dual federalism" period was
United States v. E. C. Knight Co. 57 In E. C. Knight, the Court
invalidated Congress' application of the Sherman Antitrust
Act to a monopoly acquisition of sugar refineries. The Court
determined that the regulation of "manufacture" was reserved
to the states by the tenth amendment and, therefore, was be-
yond the scope of the federal commerce power. 8 The E.C
Knight opinion represented an effort by the Court to draw a
clear distinction between state and federal powers. As Chief
Justice Fuller wrote:
It is vital that the independence of the commercial power
and of the police power, and the delimitation between them,
however sometimes perplexing, should always be recognized
and observed, for while the one furnishes the strongest bond
of union, the other is essential to the preservation of the au-
tonomy of the States as required by our dual form of govern-
53. See, e.g., Swift v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905); United States v. E.C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1894).
54. NOWAK, supra note 36, at 150.
55. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
56. NOWAK, supra note 36, at 150.
57. 156 U.S. 1 (1894).
58. Id. at 11-13.
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ment; and acknowledged evils, however grave and urgent
they may appear to be, had better be borne, than the risk be
run, in the effort to suppress them, of more serious conse-
quences by resort to expedients of even doubtful
constitutionality. 9
The Supreme Court subsequently shifted from its "dual
federalism" theory to a "stream of commerce" theory. Origi-
nally stated by Justice Holmes in Swift v. United States,6 ° the
"stream of commerce" theory permitted federal regulation of
commerce if a "direct" connection existed between the regu-
lated activity and interstate commerce.
The Court reaffirmed Holmes' "stream of commerce" the-
ory in Stafford v. Wallace.61 Writing for the Stafford majority,
Chief Justice Taft explained that increased interstate com-
merce necessitated an increase in commercial regulation:
"[S]uch streams of commerce from one part of the country to
another which are ever flowing are in their very essence the
commerce among the States... which historically it was one
of the chief purposes of the Constitution to bring under na-
tional protection and control.1
62
Although the Court was now willing to uphold new fed-
eral commercial regulations, it appeared willing to do so only
where there existed a demonstrably "direct" impact on inter-
state commerce, an inherently subjective concept. The Court
was still reluctant to follow Marshall's early interpretation in
Gibbons that the commerce power, "like all others vested in
Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost
extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are pre-
scribed in the constitution."
63
From 1933 to 1937, although the Court vacillated in the
manner in which it dealt with state economic regulation, a
majority continued to support strict control over the scope of
59. Id. at 13.
60. 196 U.S. 375 (1905). Swift upheld the application of the Sherman Act to an
agreement of meat dealers regarding their bidding practices at stockyards which fixed
the prices of meat. The Court noted that, although the activity took place within a
single state, it was only a temporary stop in the interstate sale of cattle. Id.
61. 258 U.S. 495 (1922) (holding that Congress could subject meat stockyard deal-
ers to regulation by the Secretary of Agriculture).
62. Id. at 519.
63. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 9.
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federal commercial legislation." The most important decision
of this period came in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.6 In Carter,
the Court struck down Congressional efforts to regulate labor
relations in the depressed coal industry as being outside the
scope of the federal power. The Court followed tenth amend-
ment analysis and held that the relationship between employ-
ers and employees in all production occupations was a purely
local activity and, as such, was under the exclusive control of
the states.66
The Carter opinion demonstrated the Court's unwilling-
ness to alter its rigid, narrow position toward federal regula-
tion of commerce, despite the economic depression. However,
in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. ,67 the Court began
to retreat from its narrow position and adopted a new, more
liberal approach to defining federal commerce power.
As part of its new approach, the Court refused to follow
its former theories defining the commerce power. The Court
no longer defined the commerce power in terms of tenth
amendment restrictions and dismissed the "stream of com-
merce" theory. Rather, in Jones & Laughlin, the Court for-
mulated a "close and substantial relation" test. Under this
test, Congress could regulate commercial activities that,
although seemingly intrastate in character, "have such a close
and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their con-
trol is essential ... to protect that commerce from burdens
and obstructions. ' 68  In Jones & Laughlin, the Court ex-
panded the concept of federal commerce power for the first
time since Gibbons. Nevertheless, the Court was cautious not
to broaden the power to such an extent as to "embrace effects
upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to em-
64. NOWAK, supra note 36, at 157.
65. 298 U.S. 238 (1936). The act in question was the Bituminous Coal Conversion
Act of 1935 under which coal producers were required to follow the maximum hour
labor terms negotiated between miners and producers of more than two-thirds of the
annual tonnage production for the preceding calendar year. Minimum wages for em-
ployees were fixed in a similar manner.
66. Id. at 304.
67. 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relation Act and the Board's
orders against interference by employers with union activities).
68. Id. at 37.
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brace them.., would effectually obliterate the distinction be-
tween what is national and what is local."
69
In 1942, the Court moved further toward the recognition
of a plenary federal commerce power based on economic the-
ory. In Wickard v. Filburn,70 the Court held that particular
intrastate activities of a very small scale could be subject to
federal regulation if such activities affected interstate com-
merce when placed in combination with similar small-scale
activities. Justice Jackson wrote:
[E]ven if appellee's activity be local and though it may not
be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature,
be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic
effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of
whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have
been defined as"direct" or "indirect. 71
The Wickard opinion demonstrates an explicit return by
the Court to Justice Marshall's original definition of com-
merce as commercial intercourse that affects more than one
state. In Wickard, the Court expressed a willingness to permit
federal regulation of virtually any economic activity, so long
as such activity arguably could have some impact on interstate
commerce. As Justice Jackson noted:
The commerce power is not confined in its exercise to the
regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to
those activities intrastate which so affect interstate com-
merce, or the exertion of the power of Congress over it, as to
make regulation of them appropriate means to the attain-
ment of a legitimate end, the effective execution of the
71granted power to regulate interstate commerce ....
In returning to Marshall's interpretation of the commerce
power, the Supreme Court adopted a position which was
wholly consistent with the Framers' intentions when they in-
corporated the commerce clause into the Constitution. The
Court had now come full circle to a position of strong nation-
alism. Under this position, preserving broad powers in the
69. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37.
70. 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding the application of a marketing quota for wheat
to a farmer who grew a small amount of wheat only for his own consumption).
71. Id. at 125.
72. Id. at 124 (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119
(1942)).
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hands of the national government was seen as a means of se-
curing individual economic liberty.
In accordance with this view, the Court upheld various
federal regulations of state economic activities within the
scope of the federal commerce power.73 The Court continued
to hold this view until 1976, during which time it upheld, inter
alia, the application of federal statutes regulating state-owned
railroad companies.74 In 1968, the Supreme Court, in Mary-
land v. Wirtz,75 upheld the application of federal minimum
wage requirements to employees of state and local govern-
ments. The Court held that the Constitution did not exempt
state and local government employment practices from the
reach of the federal commerce power and opined that the fed-
eral government, in acting to achieve proper goals, may over-
ride important state interests.76 However, the Court did
caution Congress that it could not engage in the "utter de-
struction of the State as a sovereign political entity. '77
In 1976, however, the Court again retreated from its posi-
tion of favoring the exercise of broad federal commerce power
and renewed the Court's tenth amendment theory regarding
the protection of state power in the area of commerce. In Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery,78 the Supreme Court, in a five
to four decision, held that minimum wage and overtime pay
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act were not appli-
cable to the employees of state governments. National League
of Cities overruled Wirtz and held the tenth amendment to be
a specific check on the power of Congress to regulate certain
economic activities of state and local governments.79
It is important to note that National League of Cities left
undisturbed the modern test for finding relationships between
intrastate and interstate commerce; the Court continued to
maintain the position that Congress acted within its powers
when it regulated intrastate activities that "affected com-
73. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124.
74. NOWAK, supra note 36, at 171. See, e.g., California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553
(1957).
75. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
76. Id. at 195-96.
77. Id. at 196.
78. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
79. Id. at 852-55.
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merce." However, in National League of Cities, the Court
found in the tenth amendment a guarantee that Congress
could not abrogate a state's plenary authority over matters es-
sential to the state's separate and independent existence" and
that the tenth amendment barred Congress from exercising
the power to regulate traditional state governmental
activities.81
The issue of regulation of state and local governments was
revisited by the Court in 1985, this time with a result contrary
to National League of Cities. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth.,82 the Supreme Court overruled its decision in
National League of Cities and returned plenary commerce
power to the federal government. In overruling its prior deci-
sion, the Court determined that National League of Cities
"tried to repair what did not need repair. ' 83 As Justice Black-
mun explained, the Court tried to "articulate affirmative lim-
its on the Commerce Clause power in terms of.
fundamental attributes of state sovereignty. ' 84 This approach
was unnecessary, Blackmun wrote, because the "principal and
basic limit on the federal commerce power is that inherent in
all congressional action - the built-in restraints that our sys-
tem provides through state participation in federal govern-
mental action. ' 85
Garcia appears to express clearly the Court's desire to
maintain state sovereignty and to act in a manner consistent
with the Framers' intent. The Framers expressly intended
that the structure of the federal system itself was to be the
principal means for defining the role of the states in the sys-
tem.86 As Justice Blackmun wrote:
[T]he Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which
special restraints on federal power over the States inhered
principally in the workings of the National Government it-
self, rather than in discrete limitations on the objects of fed-
eral authority. State sovereign interests, then, are more
80. Id. at 852.
81. Id.
82. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
83. Id. at 557.
84. Id. at 556.
85. Id.
86. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 255 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the
structure of the federal system than by judicially created lim-
itations on federal power.87
As demonstrated previously, the Framers clearly ex-
pressed their intention to grant the federal government broad
power to promote the economic interests of its citizens. The
Supreme Court, however, has repeatedly altered its position in
defining the scope of the federal commerce power. In Garcia,
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Framers' intentions and
found perhaps the most effective method of maintaining indi-
vidual economic rights. The Court decided to remove most
judicially created limitations on the federal commerce power
and to rely instead on the very structure of the republic to
strike a proper balance between state and federal powers.
The Framers incorporated flexibility into the Constitution
by establishing a role for government in regulating commer-
cial enterprise that could evolve with social and economic
change. The commerce clause was selected as the primary ve-
hicle through which Congress could regulate commerce to
preserve individual economic liberties. In the words of Justice
Jackson:
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that
every farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to
produce by the certainty that he will have free access to
every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will
withhold his exports, and no foreign state will by customs,
duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every con-
sumer may look to the free competition from every produc-
ing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by
any. Such was the vision of the Founders; such has been the
doctrine of this Court which has given it reality.88
As foreseen by the Framers, there are many special inter-
est groups in America: rich and poor, commercial and non-
commercial, large states and small states, manufacturing and
farming. The Framers felt that the increased competition re-
sulting from the development of various economic interests
would result in citizens enjoying a higher degree of personal
liberty. The Framers also recognized, however, that it was the
87. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552.
88. H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).
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role of government to regulate those interests for the common
good. The Framers saw broad federal power under the com-
merce clause as a means for preserving those personal liberties
within a national economy.
As previously stated, Hamilton indicated in The Federalist
No. 12, that the Framers of the Constitution envisioned the
creation of "one great American system, '8 9 a large commer-
cial republic, intended to ensure the freedom to work and, by
the dignity of one's own labor, the opportunity to accumulate
wealth and prosperity. Today, the Supreme Court, as re-
flected in its Garcia decision, once again appears willing to
embrace the Framers' vision of utilizing plenary federal com-
merce power to ensure that all citizens throughout the nation
be treated with dignity and have the opportunity to pursue
their economic self-interests.
IV. PROTECTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL ECONOMIC
LIBERTIES OF THE AMERICAN WORKER: THE
FRAMERS' SYSTEM AT WORK
Economic freedom of all individuals is crucial to the suc-
cess of a republic based on free enterprise. Without regulation,
however, a system based on free enterprise can lead to an im-
balance of power between groups such as employers and em-
ployees. A strong central government was necessary,
Madison and Hamilton concluded, to regulate and preserve
the role of special interest groups. The Framers' intent in this
regard as far as employees were concerned was largely ignored
by the courts until the mid-1800's when the American labor
movement became a genuine force in national politics.
A. Early Hostility Toward Employee Interests
In the early years of the new republic, the rights of work-
ers were generally left unprotected by Congress and the
courts. The first recorded labor case in the United States,
Commonwealth v. Pullis,90 took place in Pennsylvania at the
beginning of the nineteenth century. Pullis, commonly known
as the Philadelphia Cordwainers case, arose when a group of
89. See THE FEDERALIST No. 12, supra note 42.
90. Commonwealth v. Pullis, reprinted in 3 J. COMMONS & E. GILMORE, A Docu-
MENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 59 (1910).
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boot and shoemakers went on strike in Philadelphia because
their wages were cut. Eight of the employees were charged
with, and convicted of, the crime of "combin[ing] and con-
spir[ing] to raise their wages." 91 The Philadelphia Cordwain-
ers decision typified the lack of protection which the courts
provided to concerted employee efforts in pursuit of higher
wages and better working conditions - efforts to obtain for
themselves a larger share of the wealth they helped to
produce. 92
Despite the early judicial bias against labor organizations,
employees still attempted to organize for the improvement of
their economic conditions.93 In the mid-1800's, a change oc-
curred as reflected in Commonwealth v. Hunt,94 a Massachu-
setts Supreme Court case. There, the court formulated an
"ends and means" test which basically held that criminal lia-
bility could not be imposed on a union without specific consid-
eration of the legality of the union's objectives and its means
of attaining them.95 The Hunt decision was an important step
in the development of employee rights in the United States.
As one commentator has noted, "coming in the early period
of union development and made by Chief Justice [Lemuel]
Shaw, who enjoyed great prestige in the legal profession, [the
Hunt decision] has gone far to discourage the use of the crimi-
nal conspiracy doctrine in labor cases." 96
After Hunt, labor unions were better able to increase their
membership and to pursue their policy of advancing the eco-
nomic interests of the workers. On November 15, 1881, the
Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions, the prede-
cessor of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), was established in Pitts-
burgh. Item one of the Federation's platform called upon
state legislatures and Congress to give workers "the right to
91. Id.
92. During the early decades of the nineteenth century, Connecticut, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New York and Pennsylvania followed the conspiracy doctrine of the
Cordwaners case. E. LIEBERMAN, UNIONS BEFORE THE BAR 15 (1950).
93. Id. at 16.
94. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842).
95. See id.
96. LIEBERMAN, supra note 92, at 27-28.
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the protection of their property in like manner as the property of
all other persons and societies."19 7
While including demands for social legislation, the new
Federation also sought adoption of laws to give "every Ameri-
can industry full protection from the cheap labor of foreign
countries."98 The Federation pledged "to use all honorable
measures" to achieve its goals.99 In 1893, Samuel Gompers,
president of the American Federation of Labor, succinctly
stated: "What does labor want? We want more schoolhouses
and less jails; more books and less arsenals; more learning and
less vice; more constant work and less crime; more leisure and
less greed; more justice and less revenge. ' ' 00
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, and in the
early years of the twentieth century, the courts continued to
treat certain labor activities with a degree of hostility through
the use of civil injunctions against strikes, picketing and boy-
cotts. The use of the injunction began to wane, ironically,
when the Supreme Court, in In re Debs,101 upheld the use of
an injunction against the American Railway Union.
Although the decision appeared unfavorable to unions, it had
a long-term beneficial impact upon the labor movement as it
focused national attention on the use of the injunction, and
generated considerable political support for labor's demand
that the courts stop intervening in labor-management
conflicts. 102
The civil law of torts was also sometimes used to frustrate
union interests. Based on highly subjective reasoning, the
courts often would enjoin unions from using their most effec-
tive devices for gaining recognition, that is, strikes, picket
lines and boycotts, holding such activities to be inherently in-
timidating and violent, or to have economic goals which were
97. Report of First Annual Session of the Federation of Organized Trades and La-
bor Unions of the United States and Canada 1, 1 (1881) (emphasis added).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Murphy, The Commercial Republic and the Dignity of Work, NATIONAL Fo-
RUM 51 (Fall 1984).
101. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
102. A. GOLDMAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELA-
TIONS LAW 8-9 (1976).
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antisocial or unfairly restrictive of the rights of others. 10 3 A
double standard was followed by the courts in that means or
objectives which were deemed perfectly lawful when pursued
by others were enjoined as tortious civil actons when pursued
by an organizaton of employees.
B. The Legislature's Struggle to Guarantee
Employee Rights
In Loewe v. Lawlor,1°4 the Supreme Court sustained the
applicability of the Sherman Act of 1890 to unions and union
activities. The Court determined that union activities were
within the scope of the Act's ban on "any combination
whatever to secure action which essentially obstructs the free
flow of commerce between the States, or restricts .. the lib-
erty of a trader to engage in business." 105 However, six years
after Loewe, due to widespread public resentment against the
Court's application of the Sherman Act to union activities,
Congress adopted the Clayton Act, which appeared to place
union activities outside the reach of the antitrust laws; for ex-
ample, Section 6 of the Clayton Act provides that:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article
of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall
be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor
... organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help
... or to forbid or restrain individual members of such orga-
nizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members
thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or
conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws. 106
103. See, e.g., George Jones Glass Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 77 N.J. Eq.
219, 79 A. 262 (1911) (the court held that both picketing and boycotting of an employer
by its employees was tortious interference and subject to injunction); Plant v. Woods,
176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900) (the court held that "recognition" or "organiza-
tional" picketing is tortious and subject to injunction); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass.
92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896) (the court held that a work stoppage which was legal for one
person became illegal when carried out by a combination of workers).
104. 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
105. Id. at 293 (emphasis added).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982).
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Further, section 20 of the Clayton Act prohibits the federal
courts from issuing restraining orders or injunctions in labor
disputes against certain concerted activities. 7
On its face, the Clayton Act appeared to exempt from the
scope of antitrust laws all collective bargaining and peaceful
concerted activities. Despite the apparent broad applicability
of the Clayton Act, the Court has interpreted it in a narrow
manner, 108 limiting the scope of legitimate union activities
protected by the Clayton Act.
During World War I, railroads were subjected to govern-
ment operation and standards. When the war ended, control
over railroad employment was returned to private manage-
ment which was less sympathetic than was government to the
rights of employees. As a result, the rights of these workers
became a hot topic of post-war public debate.109
Meanwhile, Congress was continuing its search for a con-
stitutional method to regulate labor-management conflicts in
the railroad industry. In 1926, Congress enacted the Railway
Labor Act 10 in an effort to override the Supreme Court's in-
terpretations of previous labor regulations."11 The Railway
Labor Act repudiated Adair v. United States12 which had
constitutionalized an employer's right to discharge employees
solely because of their union affiliations. The Railway Labor
Act gave both employees and employers the right to designate
107. Section 20 of the Clayton Act provides in relevant part:
[No] restraining order or injuction shall prohibit any person or persons, whether
singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of employment... ceasing to
perform any work or labor.., recommending, advising, or persuading others by
peaceful means so to do... attending at any place... for the purpose of peace-
fully obtaining or communicating information . . . peacefully persuading any
person to work or to abstain from working... ceasing to patronize... any party
to such dispute, or ... recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful
and lawful means so to do ....
29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982).
108. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921). The Court
upheld an injunction against the Machinist Union whose members, while working for
newspaper publishers in New York, engaged in a secondary boycott in support of an
attempt by machinists in Michigan to unionize a major national printing press. Id.
109. A. GOLDMAN, supra note 102, at 32.
110. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982).
111. A. GOLDMAN, supra note 102, at 32.
112. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
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bargaining representatives "without interference, influence or
coercion."113
In 1930, in Texas & N. O.R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. &
S.S. Clerks,114 the Supreme Court surprisingly rejected a chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of the Railway Labor Act, when
a railroad discharged a number of its employees for their
union activities. The Supreme Court dismissed the Adair case
as "inapplicable"11 5 and held that the Railway Labor Act
should be construed to empower the courts to enjoin employ-
ers from discharging employees for their union activities. The
Court also held that such interference with employer action
was not unconstitutional.1 16 Thus, the Court set the stage for
the constitutionality of similar statutes protecting the rights of
workers. For example, in 1932, Congress enacted the Norris-
La Guardia Act which afforded greater protection to employ-
ees than previously existed. 1 7
Shortly after the enactment of the Norris-La Guardia Act,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt took office together with
House and Senate Democratic majorities. The Roosevelt Ad-
ministration successfully pushed through Congress the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), Section 7 of which
guaranteed employees the right to unionize free from em-
ployer interference,"1 thus encouraging labor unions to in-
crease their organizational efforts. Union activity, under the
protection of the NIRA, however, was met with great resist-
ance by management. Ultimately, in 1935, the Act was held
unconstitutional in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States.1 1 9
113. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1982).
114. 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
115. Id. at 570-71.
116. Id. at 571.
117. The Norris-La Guardia Act forbade the issuance of injunctions by federal
courts in certain types of labor disputes and contained a declaration of policy proclaim-
ing the equity of the employee right of self-organization to governmental protection of
capital, collectively organized into corporations and business associations; it also strictly
confined procedures, required courts to satisfy specific standards of proof, and entitled
those not in a direct employment relationship with a given employer to the benefit of
insurance coverage. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982).
118. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
119. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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In the landmark National Labor Relations Act of 1935
(the Wagner Act), 120 Congress announced a new affirmative
government role in labor-management disputes. The Wagner
Act established substantive rules of labor law, the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to administer such rules, and
gave the NLRB the power to determine any question of repre-
sentation 121 and "to prevent any person from engaging in any
unfair labor practice."12 2 The Act represented a public policy
decision to encourage unionization, collective bargaining and
the free flow of commerce, thus equitably balancing the eco-
nomic interests of employers and employees.1 23
Congress rightly perceived that social and economic
changes required legislative action to preserve the dignity and
economic freedom of the labor force in America. In other
words, through the Wagner Act, Congress affirmed the Fram-
ers' belief that, in order for society to attain its highest degree
of freedom and power, every individual's interest in his or her
own economic well-being had to be fostered and encouraged.
By so allowing - and encouraging - the right of workers to
organize, Congress ensured that each worker would feel that
he or she had a genuine economic stake in the republic and an
opportunity to share in the wealth that he or she helped to
produce.
Nevertheless, constitutional challenges were raised against
the Wagner Act based on the proposition that the Constitu-
tion does not specifically empower Congress to regulate labor
relations between employers and employees. In NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,124 the Supreme Court revolu-
tionized labor relations in the United States when it upheld
the constitutionality of the Wagner Act. For the first time,
explicit positive rights for labor unions were judicially recog-
nized. Jones & Laughlin involved an attempt by the NLRB to
prevent a large integrated steel producer from engaging in
"unfair labor practices," that is, the alleged discriminatory fir-
ing of employees for union activity. 125 The Court held, first,
120. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
121. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 160 (1982).
122. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982).
123. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
124. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
125. Id. at 22-29.
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that the employer's unfair practices provisions of the Wagner
Act did not constitute a denial of due process with respect to
individual employee's liberty to contract;1 2 6 and second, that
Congress' power under the commerce clause extended to the
interstate business of the steel manufacturer.1 27
The validation of the Wagner Act unleashed the energies
of the organized labor movement. Not only did Commerce
Clause jurisprudence shift in the direction of a national econ-
omy, as envisioned by the Framers, but also workers received
the Supreme Court's stamp of approval regarding their lawful
union activities. Workers were guaranteed rights concerning
the terms of their work employment and were afforded that
level of dignity in their work which the Framers had in mind
when they created the republic.
Soon after the Jones & Laughlin decision, jurisdictional
strikes between different unions became common and unions
utilized secondary boycotts in support of their demands. Such
tactics affected the status of labor unions in public esteem.1 28
In 1947, growing public concern motivated Congress to
amend the Wagner Act by passing the Taft-Hartley Act.
Although formally entitled the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947, the scope of the Taft-Hartley Act reaches beyond
labor-management relations and provides for the regulation of
union/member relations and union political activities. The
basic philosophy behind the Taft-Hartley Act, however, was
to reaffirm policies in favor of the commercial benefits of col-
lective bargaining and in favor of employee dignity through
equal bargaining power.
Congress recognized that certain labor union practices
could burden or obstruct the uninhibited pursuit of material
self-interest.12 9 Accordingly, the Taft-Hartley Act prohibited
various union activities as unfair labor practices and added to
employee rights the right to refrain from any and all union
activities.' 30 The Taft-Hartley Act also placed unions under
the same sort of responsibility as employers with the duty to
126. Id. at 43-49.
127. Id. at 34-41.
128. A. GOLDMAN, supra note 102, at 35.
129. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1982).
130. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
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bargain in good faith, and restricted the use of secondary boy-
cott pressure by giving the NLRB authority to seek injunctive
relief. 3 1 The Taft-Hartley Act added other provisions to the
NLRA which dealt with jurisdictional disputes, 132 certain
union procedures1 33 and certain internal union policies. 134
Thus, over the years Congress and the Supreme Court
have gradually reaffirmed the Framers' vision by sanctioning a
national economy which provides everyone with the opportu-
nity to participate. Federal labor regulation has maintained
the ideal that each and every citizen should have the right to
choose his or her own way in the national economy. By re-
moving the monopolistic bargaining power which employers
at one time enjoyed over employees, and by ensuring that
union leadership does not dominate and overwhelm the rights
of individual employees, Congress and the Supreme Court
have preserved the Framers' intention that the republic ac-
tively promote a national free economy for the benefit of all its
individual citizens. In addition, federal labor regulation is
consistent with the Framers' vision in that they conceived of a
system which would promote the pursuit of self-interest by all
segments of society, including management, unions and the
individual members of both groups, thus preventing the evils
of dominance by a majority faction.
Congress and the Supreme Court have adapted over the
years to reflect the Framers' vision that basic human dignity
and the right to pursue one's own material interests enhance
freedom and that individual rights can only be protected by
the guarantee of economic liberty.
The principal aim of federal regulation in the United
States has been, and is, to protect individual rights through
uniform regulation. The primary philosophy underlying the
Constitution is that all individuals are guaranteed the oppor-
tunity to receive an individual stake in the national economy.
The Constitution provides an incentive for employers and em-
ployees to prosper, as they are confident that they will be able
to retain the fruits of their investment and labor. This, in
131. 29 U.S.C. § 1600) (1982).
132. 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(k), 164 (1982).
133. 29 U.S.C. §§ 159-162, 165-166 (1982).
134. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982).
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turn, encourages economic and material progress which bene-
fits the entire society. In the United States, where all individu-
als are provided with the opportunity to receive a stake in the
national economy, we have seen enormous growth as individ-
ual freedom has unleashed awesome amounts of creative
energy. 13
5
It is clear that one of the key factors that distinguishes the
United States from other countries, and that makes our Con-
stitution exceptional, is the protection and encouragement of
individual economic rights. Indeed, there is no historical evi-
dence of any society that successfully guaranteed personal
freedom without guaranteeing economic freedom. The Fram-
ers clearly envisioned that materialism would be inextricably
intertwined with freedom, and that without material security
personal freedom would become nonexistent. Ours is a sys-
tem which is premised upon preserving the dignity of the indi-
vidual and is designed so that every individual will be
motivated to pursue his or her own economic self-interests in
a national marketplace.
As we celebrate the Bicentennial of our Constitution, we
cannot help but marvel at the overwhelming ingenuity which
the Framers possessed in drafting the Constitution. 136 The
Constitution and our system of government have endured be-
cause the American people are continually striving to achieve
their own chosen goals, by which they benefit themselves, so-
ciety, and all of mankind.
As President Ronald Reagan said in his State of the Union
address on January 27, 1987:
The U.S. Constitution is the impassioned vehicle by which
we travel through history. It grew out of the most funda-
mental inspiration of our existence ... that living free re-
leases in us the noblest of impulses and the best of our
abilities. That we would use these gifts and generous pur-
135. Cannon, Freedom and Creativity: Why America Flourishes Under the Consti-
tution, AM. EDUC. 36 (Spring 1982).
136. In 1987, we celebrate the two hundredth anniversary of the signing of the
Constitution; in 1988, its ratification; in 1989, the first Chief Executive in Congress; in
1990, the establishment of our independent federal judiciary; and in 1991, the Bicenten-
nial of the Bill of Rights.
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poses and would secure them not just for ourselves, and for
our children, but for all mankind. 137
V. CONCLUSION
So far the Constitution and the Commercial Republic have
met all challenges involving the safety and prosperity of the
country. The Framers believed in freedom of political and
religious thought, freedom of economic opportunity, patriot-
ism, due process, family and more. These values of the past
- which made our country great - must be preserved in the
years ahead.
What higher tribute could we pay to the Framers of the
Constitution than to make this a decade devoted to constitu-
tional literacy! It would honor our past and guarantee our
future. For our society cannot remain free unless its citizens
understand the document which guarantees our freedom.
Hamilton and Madison dreamed of far more for this na-
tion than just economic success. They wanted a populace nur-
tured on the principles of freedom and sound government.
The Constitution they championed has endured.
And so, as we move more and more into high technology
in the changing workplace, we must ensure that all citizens of
this great land have the opportunity to obtain their economic
stake, that the climate enables businesses to grow and create
new jobs, and that opportunities abound.
The Commercial Republic is still - as it was 200 years
ago - the best system by which men and women, of whatever
skills and abilities, can live peacefully, prosper, and work to
find their own american dream.
137. Address by President Ronald Reagan on the State of the Union (Jan. 27,
1987).
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